What Incentives Does Israel Have to Agree to a Cease Fire?
A summary analysis by a combat veteran
The following is a guest post (originally on LinkedIn), by an Army officer with extensive combat experience in the Mideast and the Levant.
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What incentives does Israel have to cease counter-Hamas operations?
Nations, like individuals, historically (not always) operate off a series of incentives.
Net positive = do it
Net negative = avoid it
An easy concept to understand but not simple in practice.
There is no shortage in calls for Israel to implement a ceasefire with Hamas, despite the fact that the current conflict is a direct result of the October 7 Hamas attack where over 1100 Israelis were killed, many of them civilians.
To date Israel has resisted these calls, including those from the U.S., for an operational stand down.
But why?
As a student and practitioner of war I find myself asking, what incentives does Israel have to bow to international pressure?
This is NOT a political commentary, merely a thought experiment on incentives vs. disincentives.
Below are three reasons why Israel has no incentive to stop short of total victory:
1. No matter what steps Israel implements to protect civilians (not arguing the success of those attempts here) they are accused of genocide.
John Spencer of the Modern Warfare Institute at West Point discusses the steps Israel has taken to prevent civilian casualties in a Newsweek op ed titled, “Israel Implemented More Measures to Prevent Civilian Casualties Than Any Other Nation in History.”
If Israel has taken unprecedented steps to reduce the numbers of civilian casualties but is still accused of war crimes and genocide, what incentive do they have to cease their operations?
2. Despite the fact that Hamas started the war, and continues to hold dozens of civilian hostages, the incentives presented to Israel are punitive while Hamas receives the promise of more benefits.
A May 10 emergency special session of the UN General Assembly passed a measure to upgrade Palestine UN Membership also urging the Security Council to grant full membership.
If Hamas can slaughter over 1100 Israelis in a surprise attack and receive possible UN membership for its troubles, why would Israel stop short of their stated goal which is to “wipe Hamas off the face of the earth”?
3. Lastly, with Hamas stating that they will repeats the October 7th attacks as many times as necessary why would Israel stop short of their total destruction?
Ghazi Hamad, a member of Hamas’ political bureau said, "We must teach Israel a lesson, and we will do it twice and three times. The Al-Aqsa Deluge (the name Hamas gave its Oct 7 onslaught) is just the first time, and there will be a second, a third, a fourth.…"
Pretty unambiguous.
After examining the evidence and assessing the risks and rewards of different courses of action I can only come to the conclusion that Israel has very little, if any, incentives to alter their behavior.
Quite to the contrary, Israel has very little to lose and much to gain from its efforts to prevent future attacks like the one perpetrated on October 7.
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Full disclosure: The author is my son, Lieutenant Colonel David Lucas. He is currently a battalion commander whose prior assignments including command of multiple special operations elements and overseas task forces. He has extensive combat experience beginning twenty years ago in the Mideast. The views expressed above are his personal analysis, and he does not speak on behalf of the Army.
Nor would Israel receive any compliments for agreeing to a ceasefire, either. Most of those who accuse Israel of "genocide' (Interesting choice of words there, too) would continue in their criticisms of everything Israel does in any case. Despite however much my government pretends to support Israel, I wouldn't trust this administration as far as I could throw them.
It is also telling that no one ever even attempts to make any case for an upside for Israel if they were to agree a ceasefire. The agitators don't even lie about that. No promises (that would be broken, sure); I would say instead a certainty of ratcheting pressure on Israel to do less, become more vulnerable, commit national suicide. No carrots, always more sticks for Israel. They'd be insane at this point to expect anything else.
Disclosure: I'd be fine if they were to devote fewer resources to tactics that protect so-called civilians; theirs is likely the better strategy but their reward will be only in the next world. Which, to be fair, is where our hearts should be.